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THE SPECTER OF SISYPHUS
INTRODUCTION
The spread of the global financial crisis from its beginnings in the United
States to economies around the world has necessitated extraordinary and
concerted action by regulators to contain the fallout. As the dust settles, the
crisis provides a unique opportunity to more accurately understand the
operation of the international financial marketplace and the regulatory
mechanisms that have been put in place to oversee its workings.2 While the
actions of domestic regulators have given much cause for examination, the
globally contagious spread of crisis has turned the analytical spotlight on the
international regulatory framework and its ability to act to exert control over an
increasingly consolidated financial market in products and services.3
Domestic regulators have undergone a period of institutional soul-searching
to critically evaluate their performance in predicting the market turmoil and
reacting to it once the seriousness of the disruptions became apparent. Reform
agendas have been developed and remain works in progress, as the causes of
the crisis come into sharper focus and expose the vulnerabilities within
national regulatory frameworks.4 While this work continues within domestic
fora, the globalized aspects of recent events necessitate an examination of the
international dimension of financial regulation. As evidenced by recent
events, the presence of international financial firms, combined with a dispersal
of complex financial products across jurisdictions, has resulted in an
international interweave of risk-both economic and legal-that cannot be
6
fully understood from a domestic perspective alone. Further, in addition to
better grasping the patterns of risk developing across borders, international
oversight mechanisms become especially salient where multi-jurisdictional
firms fail outright (e.g. Lehman Brothers),7 or otherwise, where emergency
regulator assistance is deemed necessary to avert cross-border systemic
1 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER
BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 9 (2009) [hereinafter BASEL COMM.].
2 David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARv. L. REv. 696, 741-43 (2008) (reviewing
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL
ABouT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)).
3 See id. at 742-43.
4 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, BUILDING A NEW
FOUNDATION: RE-BUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2-9 (2009) [hereinafter NEW
FOUNDATION]; U.K. FIN. SERVS. AuTH., THE TURNER REvIEw: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS 5-21 (2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW].
5 NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 5-6.
6 Id. at 29-60.
SId.
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spillover (e.g. the failure of Fortis or ING). Finally, effective international
oversight and the application of common rules to comparable practices are
desirable to act as a counter-weight to the incidence of regulatory arbitrage by
firms seeking to exploit differences between country laws to turn handsome
but potentially risky profits.
This Article examines the legal workings of international financial
regulatory mechanisms from the perspective of how these have performed in
the lead up to and during the global financial crisis. In particular, the Article
analyzes normative rationales for regulation and applies these to the specific
context and challenges posed by the international regulatory framework. It then
discusses how this framework can be reformed to better reflect these rationales
within the constraints imposed by a supranational legal system and to mend the
cracks exposed in the course of the crisis.
This Article argues that the crisis has shown the present international
regulatory architecture to be poorly adapted for tackling the risks arising from
the increasingly dynamic and complex international financial marketplace.
While international regulators are necessarily constrained by their dependence
on domestic legal systems for application and enforcement of international
rules and standards, their role is nevertheless significant in light of the
emerging distinctness of the international financial market and its own unique
patterns of risk. Therefore, oversight of this market can be based on, and
justified by, the important rationales for regulation generally advanced in
support of domestic regulatory mechanisms. This Article seeks to propose a
new design for reform that better reflects these rationales as well as the
increasing interconnectedness of the international marketplace.
Part I of this Article sets out some key rationales for regulation together
with a discussion of the specific challenges faced by international regulators
versus their domestic counterparts. Part II examines the outlines of the current
system. Part III critically analyzes the operation of international regulatory
mechanisms during the crisis, while Part IV proposes a design for reform.
8 BASEL COMM., supra note 1, § 2.
86 [Vol. 24
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I. RATIONALES FOR REGULATION 9
A. The International Marketplace in Financial Services and Products
The provision of financial services has undergone a transformative
expansion in the last two decades, moving away from a largely domestic
market to an increasingly internationalized space. 10 This has been
accompanied, and arguably facilitated, by innovations in the types of products
offered to the market, which have shown little respect for traditional divisions
between banking, securities, and insurance businesses.11 The growth and
establishment across jurisdictions of large investment firms, together with the
development of technology, has enabled trades in financial products and
services to become global.12 By way of illustration, in 2007, three prominent
U.S. investment banks were deriving almost 50% of their net revenue from
business undertaken offshore.13 Domestically, within the United States, the
value of foreign securities holdings by U.S. investors doubled from $3.1
trillion to $6.0 trillion between 2003 and 2006, evidencing increasingly rapid
traffic in the supply and demand of cross-border financial services.14 It has
been reported that almost two-thirds of all Americans have investments in non-
U.S. companies. While cross-border financial activity has tended to gravitate
towards certain financial centers, notably London and New York,16 the overall
development of cross-border business to encompass the emerging markets has
9 This section relies on a discussion of this topic advanced in my article, Looking for the Silver Lining:
Regulatory Reform after the "Credit Crunch," in the context of reforming the framework of the U.S.
regulatory architecture. Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining: Regulatory Reform after the "Credit
Crunch," 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. (forthcoming June 2010). See also COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION, TIE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM, at i-vi (2009).
10 For a definition of what may be regarded as "international," see HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 1-30 (15th ed. 2008).
1 For example, the credit default swap may be said to operate functionally as both an insurance device as
well as a securities or futures product.
12 See, e.g., Russia, Country Forecast, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2006, at 94.
13 See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 28, 2008); Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2008); Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(Jan. 29, 2008).
14 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., REPORT ON U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN SECURITIES
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2006, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/shc2006r.pdf
15 INv. Co. INST., SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 23 (2005). For a review of the
various supervisory and regulatory approaches, see GROUP OF 30, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2008), available at
http://www.group30.org/pubs/GRP30 FRS ExecSumm.pdf
16 Martin Dickson, Capital Gain: How London Is Thriving as It Takes on the Global Competition,
FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 27, 2006, at 11.
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cemented and extended this trend to include a broader weave of country
players within the financial marketplace.17 While this trend has enabled firms
to generate considerable wealth through investment,18 it has also created
increasingly stark financial and economic vulnerabilities between countries,
such that risks affecting one jurisdiction have the ability to spread quickly to
others, taxing the regulatory resources of several country regulators
simultaneously (e.g. the failure of Dexia, Fortis, ING, Kaupthing, or Lehman
Brothers). 19
In light of the very active market in cross-border financial services, and the
risks it creates that cannot be controlled by any one domestic regulator, the
international market can be seen as distinct from the sum of its various
domestic parts. In this context, its regulation ought to seek to institutionalize
the normative policy rationales traditionally advanced to support the better
function of market regulation.
B. Key Reasons to Regulate the Financial Markets
Certain economists, notably Kevin Dowd,2 0 George Benston, and George
Kaufmann,21 have suggested that regulation itself can lead to market crisis by
muffling the incentives at work for market players to regulate their own
behavior. Criticism has also focused on the costs of regulation that may not be
sufficient to cover the multiplicity of market risks.22 However, a large body of
academic and theoretical consensus has coalesced around some key rationales
justifying the development of rules or standards to govern the markets and the
deployment of state resources to see to their application.23 An important
assertion in support of regulation cites the collective action dilemma whereby
individual firms, while appreciating the desirability of attaining a common
good, are either unwilling or institutionally unable to act to appropriately
regulate the risks arising from their own behavior and that of their peers.24
17 Russia: Country Forecast, supra note 12, at 94.
18 Id.
19 See BASEL COMM., supra note 1, § 2.
20 Kevin Dowd, The Case for Financial Laissez-Faire, 106 ECON. J. 679, 683 (1996).
21 George Benston & George Kaufinan, The Appropriate Role ofBank Regulation, 106 EcoN. J. 688, 693
(1996).
22 See David Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation 7 (Apr. 1999) (Fin. Serys.
Auth., Occasional Paper Series No. 1).
23 See CHARLES GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, How, AND WHERE Now? 2 (1998);
Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 9-12.
24 MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, at xii
(2009). In this study, the economists have noted that this may be exemplified in cases where one bank sells an
88 [Vol. 24
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Broadly, the key rationales for regulation can be summarized as follows:
1. the management of externalities, notably systemic risks;25
2. consumer protection and the correction of information
asymmetries;26
3. limitation of moral hazard.27
C. Managing Externalities
Regulation for managing systemic risk is necessary where one player or
another is unable or otherwise insufficiently equipped to act to prevent the
spread of risk through the financial markets as a whole.28 This can occur, for
example, where a shock disruption affecting one firm leads the market to
believe that other similarly situated firms may also be impacted, prompting
contagion and investor runs on the firms implicated; or where a sudden event
affects the market as a whole, leading to widespread loss of confidence and
panicked runs on financial institutions.29 In these scenarios, in order to meet
their obligations, firms can find themselves becoming tightly wound into a
spiral of losses, where they must rapidly fire-sell their assets to satisfy creditor
and depositor demand during a run, depressing asset values and prompting
further runs as balance sheets weaken across the market.30 As a result, firms
are rapidly drained of liquidity and unable to access affordable credit in the
31
absence of assets that may be used as collateral. In such cases, systemic risk
can take on a multitude of concurrent guises.32 Specifically, where firms
evidence a high degree of inter-connectedness, the spread of systemic risk
through the market is easier and can affect a number of its key components at
once, 33 further fueling the cycle of losses and rapid sell-offs. Accordingly,
regulatory intervention becomes necessary to stop the negative spiral, which
asset when the price of its risk increases. Other banks can act similarly, eventually leading to the price of that
asset falling. See id.
25 Id. at 20.
26 See id. at 29-43.
27 See id. at 1-10, 23-27.
28 SCOTT, supra note 10, at 903; BRUNNERMEIERET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
29 SCOTT, supra note 10, at 110-14.
30 BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 24, at 2-4.
31 Id. at 14-20.
32 Id.; SCOTT, supra note 10, at 110-14.
33 For example, firms can be connected through the payments system, clearing and settlement
mechanisms, the inter-bank lending market, and through risk-management devices such as chains of credit
default swaps. For further discussion, see generally SCOTT, supra note 10, at 95-160.
2010] 89
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can be done, for example, through the provision of emergency liquidity
support 34 or the purchase en masse of distressed and toxic assets weighing
down the balance sheets of financial institutions, possibly through asset
management companies like the Resolution Trust Corporation deployed during
the Savings and Loans Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 3 5
In addition to acting to avert the spread of systemic crises, regulation is
seen as necessary for the maintenance of financial stability and the safety and
soundness of market participants.36 As set out above, the role of regulation is
underscored by the perceived inability of firms to act in the common interest
where it might adversely affect their own.37 Accordingly, regulators are
expected to set benchmarks for controlling the risks posed by market entrants
as well as the risks of their continued participation (e.g. by setting qualification
criteria for their entry, such as minimum capital cushions or liquidity buffers,
to ensure that they can absorb the risks of their activities once in the market).38
Such considerations and calculations are likely to be beyond the capacity of
any one firm without a bird's eye view over market operations, and they may
not be in their (at least short-term) interests, in view of the expensive
compliance costs involved.
D. Consumer Protection and the Correction ofInformation Asymmetries
Regulation may be imposed to ensure the dissemination of high-quality
information to the market and supervisory bodies to enable sound assessments
34 See, e.g., Edmund Andrews, Federal Reserve Offers No Cash but Loosens Standards on Emergency
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A19. Actions were taken by the U.S. Federal Reserve to expand the
eligibility criteria for accessing its Primary Dealer Credit Facility to include investment banks in the aftermath
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Id.; see also Bank of England, Markets: Asset Purchase Facility,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apflindex.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (describing the Asset
Purchase Facility and Special Liquidity Scheme established by the Bank of England to purchase or swap
securities, such as mortgage backed securities, from firms). These measures are designed to increase liquidity
in the market, as seen, for example, where the Bank of England swaps mortgage-backed securities in return for
U.K. Treasury Bills that may readily serve as collateral for participating firms. Id.
35 See Nicholas F. Brady, Eugene A. Ludwig & Paul A. Volcker, Resurrect the Resolution Trust Corp.,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A27; see also G.N. OLSON, BANKs IN DiSTRESS: LESSONS FROM THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980s 201-04 (2000). Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there were
calls for an asset management vehicle akin to the Resolution Trust Corporation to purchase the toxic securities
responsible for weakening the balance sheets of firms during the current crisis. This was seen as a means to
stabilize the market and restart normal banking and trading operations and as a medium to prevent a deeper
slide into depression. See Brady et al., supra.
36 Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 9.
37 Id. at 27.
38 Id. at 26, 28, 47.
90 [Vol. 24
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of the risks to be undertaken by regulators and investors, bringing into the
public domain information disparately held by the various constituents within
the market.39
In light of the foregoing, regulation is justified on the basis that regulators
and investors cannot be expected to forage for the data necessary to evaluate
the health of firms in light of the time and costs involved.40 Such disclosure
assists regulators in determining the allocation of regulatory resources to target
41those firms that may be especially in need of oversight. In addition, it helps
investors to make better judgments about market risks and, therefore, to more
accurately tailor their investments to risk appetite.
42
Control of information further assures that insiders do not unfairly benefit
from their privileged access to information and manipulate market movement
in their favor.43 Accordingly, laws to correct information asymmetries can be
seen as warranted because different pockets of the market (e.g. insiders of a
firm, auditors, credit rating agencies, or market-wide infrastructure providers
like exchanges) may each possess different sets of information on a firm,
which, if not properly disclosed, could potentially distort its risk profile and
result in a misallocation of regulatory and investor resources.44 Finally,
disclosure of information can act as a check on excessive and opportunistic
risk taking by firms, especially in light of the agency risks arising from firms
trading with funds that are not their own.45 Accordingly, mandatory disclosure
rules can enhance conscientiousness to curb bad behavior and undue risk
taking, incentivizing agents to self-police risks, thereby giving consumers
greater confidence in the system as a whole, while assisting regulators in the
maintenance of financial stability.46
39 See Larry Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1992) (discussing why firms should disclose information); see also Llewellyn,
supra note 22, at 8-9 (discussing the benefits of information disclosure).
40 Ribstein, supra note 39, at 10.
41 Id at 11.
42 Id
43 id.
44 d
45 Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDozo L.
REv. 333, 339-40 (2006).
46 Id. at 363-64.
2010] 91
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E. Moral Hazard
The state can provide safety nets to protect investors and firms from the
risks associated with their activities. Examples of these safety nets include
deposit insurance or lender-of-last-resort facilities deployed to minimize the
spread of systemic risks.47 These arrangements may be seen as creating a moral
hazard, encouraging risk taking and ill-informed decision making.48 Llewellyn
has identified four key types of moral hazard that may arise in this context: (i)
protection for failing banks as well as deposit insurance may mean that
consumers use banks that may be risky and unsafe but offer higher rates of
return; (ii) knowing that it and its investors are protected, a firm may be
incentivized to engage in risky behavior; (iii) because of insurance, depositors
may not demand an appropriate risk premium in their deposit interest rates;
and (iv) the existence of deposit insurance may lead banks to hold lower levels
of capital. 4 9 Accordingly, regulation may be justified to limit the influence of
moral hazard and, in particular, to provide that firms and consumers are not
permitted to take advantage of taxpayer generosity and engage in undue risk
taking and opportunistic investment practices. 0
Notwithstanding the above, international financial markets cannot simply
be assumed to possess the characteristics and processes of domestic ones. For
one, most firms (with the exception, perhaps, of hedge funds or private equity
houses) are usually quite comprehensively regulated by home-state regulators,
such that they already operate under one layer of oversight when undertaking
cross-border activities.5 1 Following from this, the international financial
marketplace is catholic in its legal composition, bringing into its fold a variety
of country regulatory regimes, cultures, and governance traditions, without
seeking to accord primacy to one or the other, such that standard setting and
norms building are required to be sufficiently flexible to fit with the variety of
country frameworks involved.52 Accordingly, international financial-
governance mechanisms do not have recourse to the coercive authority of a
single state for implementation of standards but, rather, are required to have
47 Dowd, supra note 20, at 683.
48 id
49 Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 29.
50 Id. at 30.
51 See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 10, at 11I (stating that within the international system, it is the host
country that primarily deals with the systemic risk).
52 Id. at 3-4.
92 [Vol. 24
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recourse to national-enforcement processes (which in turn differ across
jurisdictions) or reputational pressure for their application.53
Nevertheless, the international financial marketplace may be regarded as
evidencing many of the same risks that have prompted domestic regulatory
action under the rationales examined above. As set out in greater detail below,
the crisis has exposed the international financial market as having a distinct set
of risks due to the cross-border nature of financial services, which cannot
easily be contained through actions taken by individual, domestic regulators
acting alone.
First, domestic regulators face a different set of incentives when dealing
with home-state firms that offer cross-border services to clients and
counterparties based abroad.54 For example, domestic regulators may wish to
rely on the regulatory mechanisms of the host countries where their firms are
offering services, thus allowing them to devote resources to policing market
behavior within their own jurisdictions. Nevertheless, with the possible
exception of the European Union, where the Internal Market has brought about
considerable harmonization in financial services standards, 5  regulatory
regimes across borders are not always of comparable standard, permitting
firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage where it is possible to do so.
Accordingly, there is a danger that firms may engage in risky behavior, taking
on high-risk clients and investing in volatile but high-yield investment
products on a cross-border basis, without the home-state regulator having
sufficient resources or motivation to include a risk assessment of these
practices in its evaluation of a firm (especially when cross-border business is
undertaken by a firm's subsidiaries, which are separate legal entities
established under the rules of a host state, rather than branches, which remain
part of the firm).
53 See, e.g., Douglas Amer & Joseph Norton, Building a Framework to Address Failure of Complex
Global Financial Institutions, 39 H.K. L.J. 95, 105 (2009) (arguing that policy makers and implementers of
regulations will be at the domestic level).
54 See Richard J. Herring, Conflicts Between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors, in
NTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTAILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATION 201, 201-20
(Douglas D. Evanoff, George G. Kaufman & John R. LaBrosse eds., 2007).
55 Amer & Norton, supra note 53, at 106. However, it should be noted that, even within the highly
harmonized environment of the European Union's internal market for financial services, differences between
countries with respect to conduct of business rules are common. For example, the Market in Financial
Instruments Directive, while generally seeking to create a maximum-harmonization regime for investment
services in the European Economic Area, gives home-state supervisors the power to impose their own set of
conduct-of-business requirements, beyond the minimum rules provided for in the Directive. Council Directive
2004/39, Market in Financial Instruments Directive, art. 61, 2004 O.J. (L145) 1 (EC).
2010] 93
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Secondly, home-state regulators are arguably faced with high structural
impediments to the accurate understanding of a firm's risk profile where
56investment activity is undertaken on a cross-border basis. For example,
access to data regarding the robustness of a firm's foreign counterparties or
investments may be rendered more difficult and opaque, leading to information
asymmetries that limit the ability to render accurate assessments of a firm's
business activities, risk profile, investors, and client-protection mechanisms. 7
Thirdly, home-country regulators may wish to champion national interests
and promote the business of their home firms abroad. There may be a potential
conflict of supervisory interest where regulators wish to ease the regulatory
burden on ambitious firms promoting a "country brand" abroad, though it may
be imperative to assure that such firms do not expand beyond their natural
capacity and resources. Consequently, regulatory accountability may be
necessary to safeguard against regulatory capture.
Fourthly, it is not always easy, or indeed possible, to distinguish between a
domestic transaction and what should be regarded as "foreign." 59 For example,
how should a transaction be classified if it involves one English bank
borrowing a sum in U.S. dollars from another English bank in England? In
addition, intangible and dematerialized assets-notably securities-can prove
troublesome to locate geographically if they are held by chains of custodians
and sub-custodians, even where both the customer and her contact custodian
may be located in the same jurisdiction.60 As a result, regulators face
difficulties in locating risks and determining whether, in fact, the regulators
61have jurisdiction to act to mitigate the risks' effects.
Lastly, given the possibility of working through often complex
organizational corporate structures, firms themselves may not be aware of the
extent and type of cross-border activity in which they are engaged-for
example, where business is undertaken through a network of foreign
subsidiaries and branches. Accordingly, where firms operate using complex
56 See Amer & Norton, supra note 53, at 112-13 (stating that regulators need to have a better
understanding of the structure, business, and risks of the firm in order to prevent the failure of the international
financial conglomerates).
57 See G-20 WORKING GROuP 1, ENHANCING SOUND REGULATION AND STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
1 (2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_wgl 010409.pdf
5s See id. at 23.
59 See UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, Oct. 9, 2009, available
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/main.htm.
60 See id.
61 See G-20 WORKiNG GROuP 1, supra note 57, at 10.
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group structures, it may be difficult for the firm itself to keep track of the scale
and scope of its activities and their overall impact on the firm's group risk
profile. 62
II. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The spread of the global financial crisis has thrown into relief the workings
of the international regulatory system for financial services, highlighting not
only the key actors involved, but also the texture of authority and influence
exercised by relevant bodies. Specific responses to crisis events are detailed in
Part III. However, this section sets out a brief overview of the basic design of
international financial regulatory mechanisms, with a view to describing some
of the central tensions underlying their operation.
A. Standard Setting
As set out above, international financial regulators are twice constrained:
(i) their pronouncements must be sufficiently elastic to sit alongside and be
eventually absorbed into a variety of country legal systems and traditions, civil
and common law alike, and (ii) without the coercive authority of the state,
adoption and implementation of international standards are largely left to be
63progressed by national country authorities. Despite this structural check on
their authority, several bodies have come to be regarded as "standard-setters"
in the international regulatory arena, wielding considerable "soft" power in
64
securing national adoption of the standards promulgated. These bodies work
to convene national regulators of member countries to facilitate greater
convergence in regulatory standards for international finance.65 The work of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("BCBS"), the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), and the International
Organization of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS")--which come together under
62 In the case of Lehman Brothers, the group consisted of 2,985 legal entities operating across fifty
jurisdictions. See BASEL COMM., supra note 1, at 14.
63 See id. at 6.
64 International standard-setting bodies include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the
Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International Accounting Standards Board, and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions. In addition, the World Bank has a standard-setting role
in the area of insolvency and creditor/debtor regimes.
65 Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Govemors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Peterson
Institute for International Economics: Financial Regulation in the Wake of the Crisis 6 (June 8, 2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo2009O6O8a.htm.
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the aegis of the Joint Forum, an organization of international financial
regulators 66-has been especially prolific in the development of a body of
international standards in the area of banking, securities, and insurance
regulation.6
7
B. BCBS
Formed in 1974, the BCBS is one of the more longstanding committees in
international financial standard setting.68 Originally formed by the central
bankers of the G-10 nations, it now comprises a membership that includes not
only the G-10, but also several emerging-market and transition economies. 69
The BCBS is notable for the formulation of statements of best practice on
banking supervisiono and most visibly, in light of the financial crisis, for the
development of the Basel Accords on capital adequacy.71 These have been
widely consumed and adopted into national legal systems to govern the
domestic regulation of capital-adequacy levels for banking institutions.72
Accordingly, with scrutiny leveled at the deficiencies of the capital-adequacy
framework to safeguard against the spread of systemic contagion (e.g. with
respect to pro-cyclicality), 73 the BCBS has faced a test of its expertise and
credibility within the regulatory framework.
C. IOSCO
IOSCO operates as the standard-setting body in the area of international
securities regulation.74 Its membership regulates approximately 95% of the
world's securities markets and provides the forum for convening world
66 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JoINT FORUM: THE MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY RISK
IN FINANCIAL GROUPS 1 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/jointl6.pdf.
67 Amer & Norton, supra note 53, at 124.
68 Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking and Supervision, History of Basel Committee and Its
Membership 1 (2009).
69 Id
70 Id.
71 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 2 (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsl 07.htm [hereinafter BASEL II].
72 Progress on Basel II Implementation, New Workstreams and Outreach, BASEL COMM. NEWSLETTER
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), May 2007, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs n 11.htm.
73 COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR
REGULATORY REFORM 57-69 (2009).
74 Financial Stability Board, 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/cos/keystandards.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
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securities regulators. The organization has developed the Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation, which form the international benchmark
76for the regulation of securities markets. In addition to this work, IOSCO has
also published the JOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding for
managing the cross-border exchange of information and for dealing with
enforcement issues in relation to the operation of the securities markets.77
Together, the IOSCO documents have as their stated objectives, among other
things, the reduction of systemic risk and the better protection of consumers
investing in the securities market, through the establishment of common
standards.7 8
D. IAIS
The IAIS brings together supervisors within the international insurance
industry. 7 9 It ranks as one of the newer bodies but now claims a standard-
setting role as a result of its expansive membership that includes regulators and
supervisors in 190 jurisdictions in 140 countries. 0 It has contributed to the
international regulatory framework through the dissemination of its principles
for the supervision of the insurance industry, developed in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 disaster and in response to the international wrangles
within the insurance and re-insurance sectors that followed.81 To supplement
this work, the IAIS has developed standards to delineate best practices for the
supervision and regulation of specific insurance and re-insurance products. 82
These standards are seen as representing best practices in the supervision and
regulation of particular insurance products, providing a benchmark for national
5 Letter from Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns to Mario Draghi, Chairman, Fin. Stability Forum, Guido
Mantegra, Minister of Fin., Brazil & Henrique Meirelles, Governor, Central Bank, Brazil (Nov. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.fsa.go jp/inter/ios/20081113/04.pdf
76 id
77 International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Historical Background, http://www.
iosco.org/aboutlindex.cft?section history (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
78 id.
79 See INT'L AsS'N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2009), available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/ temp/2008-2009 Annual report.pdf [hereinafter INS. SUPERVISORS-ANNUAL
REPORT].
8o See Nasser Saidi, Former Minister of Econ. & Trade, Minister of Indus. & First Vice Governor of the
Cent. Bank of Leb., Remarks to the Forum on Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions in
Line with International Standards and Practices: Role of Banking System in Ensuring Transparency and
Disclosure 4 (2005), available at http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/CG%/ 2OArab%/ 20countries
OMAN%5Benglish%5D.pdf; INs. SuPERvISORS-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.
81 INT'L Ass'N OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, PRINCIPLES ON GROUP-WIDE SUPERVISION 3 (2008),
available at http://www.iaisweb.org/ temp/7 Principles No 3 4 on Group-Wide Supervision.pdf
82 INS. SUPERVISORS-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 10.
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authorities to assess the operation of their own domestic legal frameworks
against those expounded by the IAIS. 83
In addition to the three key standard-setting bodies, the international
regulatory architecture has sought to establish coordination mechanisms
through the work of the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board ("FSB")
(formerly, the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF")) as well as the international
financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the World
Bank. A very brief overview of these mechanisms is set out below. 84
E. G-20/FSB
The G-20 was formed in 1999, and its membership of nineteen countries
and the EU bloc represents approximately 90% of the world's economic
output. It has supplanted in stature and function the G-8 group of countries as
the main policy forum for international economic cooperation.86 The G-20 has
grown in stature and visibility since the onset of the global financial crisis,
with the establishment of the G-20 Summit as the forum for convening the key
industrial and emerging market economies to formulate international
regulatory strategy on crisis management.87 With respect to international
regulatory action in the wake of the crisis, the G-20's Washington, D.C.
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy
established five main principles to guide the direction of regulatory reform: (i)
strengthening transparency and accountability; (ii) enhancing sound regulation;
(iii) promoting integrity of the financial markets; (iv) reinforcing international
cooperation; and (v) reforming the financial architecture.88 This G-20 agenda,
as reiterated through the G-20 Summit, is intended to play an important
83 See id.
84 It should be noted that the World Bank and the IMF both have standard-setting functions, under the
mandate of the Financial Stability Board ("FSB"). INs. SUPERVISORS-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 1-2.
85 G-20, THE GRouP OF TWENTY: A HISTORY 21, 42, 127-28 (2007), available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/history report dm1.pdf
86 Claudia Schmucker & Katharina Gnath, From the G8 to the G20: Reforming the Global Economic
Governance System 15 (Garnet Working Paper No. 73/09, 2010), available at http://www.gamet-
eu.org/fileadmin/documents/workingpapers/7310.pdf
1 Id. at 2.
88 Declaration, G-20, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy 3 (Nov. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20 summit declaration.pdf. The Washington, D.C. declaration builds
upon the central bankers and finance ministers' communication in Sao Paulo in the week preceding the
Washington, D.C. Summit. Communiqud, G-20, Meeting of Ministers and Governors, Sao Paulo, Nov. 8-9,
2008, available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/2009 communique horsham uk.pdf
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strategic role in guiding the work of the various standard-setting bodies
following the crisis.89
The FSB was formed by the G-20 at its London Summit in April 2009 to
bring regulators together to promote financial stability and provide for an early
detection mechanism for financial crises.90 Reflecting the expansion of the G-8
to the G-20, the FSF's membership has been widened under the FSB to include
representatives from emerging and transition economies. 91 The FSB is
involved in coordinating the establishment of regulatory colleges for
approximately thirty large and complex financial institutions deemed to have
special systemic significance.92 In addition, it is mandated to work with and
monitor the work of standard-setting bodies, with a special focus on
determining the adoption of standards and codes within domestic legal
frameworks and understanding the build-up of regulatory vulnerabilities
arising at the national and international level.93
Alongside the FSB, the mandate of the IMF has been brought more visibly
to the fore as a monitor of financial stability and systemic risk. The IMF works
alongside the FSB to monitor financial stability, systemic risks, and regulatory
vulnerabilities that may ignite or otherwise exacerbate the effects of financial
and economic distress.94
III. LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
The onset and spread of the crisis across several advanced economies
simultaneously has provided ample demonstration of the consequences of
regulatory failure at the international level.95 While domestic systems have also
fared badly in their institutional incapacity to prevent the seeds of this market
crisis from taking root, as evidenced by the number of reform efforts
89 Declaration, supra note 88, at 2, 4.
90 Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Re-established as the Financial Stability
Board 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr 090402b.pdf.
91 Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Decides to Broaden its Membership 1
(Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090312b.pdf
92 The list of the thirty institutions that would be overseen by a college of regulators, while intended to be
confidential, was leaked. Patrick Jenkins & Paul J. Davies, Thirty Financial Groups on Systemic Risk List, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df7c3f24-ddl9-1lde-ad6O-OOl44feabdcO,sOl=
1.html.
93 Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, supra note 91, at 1.
94 id
95 See, e.g., Robert C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 2, 8 ("It is
widely acknowledge that this crisis reflects the greatest regulatory failure in modem history.").
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underway,96 headline events that have marked the escalation of the turmoil
(and indeed tightened the turns of its negative spiral) have implicated the
international regulatory system and the problematic aspects of its operation.
While the authority of international regulators is necessarily limited by
their dependence upon national legal systems for the implementation and
enforcement of international regulatory action, a sharper focus on the creation
of a robust regulatory architecture at the international level may better support
the work of regulators, strengthening the hand that has been dealt. As
highlighted above, differences between the terms "national" and
"international" in the financial marketplace are now necessarily complex,
although often not especially meaningful. Nevertheless, institutions and bodies
established for the oversight of cross-border financial activity and its interface
with national systems are required to better reflect the marketplace in which
they operate and the rationales that govern its regulation.97
This section focuses on three case studies to discuss areas in which the
regulatory architecture at the international level failed to fully leverage its
structural potential to prevent the start and downward spiral of the crisis and
that indicate some of the fault lines underlying the workings of the system. The
case studies discussed are: (i) the near-failure of the American International
Group; (ii) the cross-border banking crisis affecting Iceland's Kaupthing bank;
and (iii) the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The basic factual context of these
cases studies is largely assumed, given media and commentator attention in the
course of recent events.
A. American International Group
Headquartered in the United States, American International Group ("AIG")
has grown into a global giant in the insurance business, spanning over 100
countries and, at the height of its prowess, controlling assets worth over $1
trillion.98 While its insurance business was unsurprisingly extensive, AIG
operated a key profits center from London-AIG Financial Products ("AIG
FP")-that gave the company a deep hold within the financial marketplace. 99
96 See, e.g., NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 4; TuRNER REvIEw, supra note 4.
9 See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 4, at7.
98 Amer & Norton, supra note 53, at 101.
99 U.S. Senator Richard Shelby referred to the AIG collapse as the "largest corporate failure in history."
American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and Implications for
Future Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 11th Cong. 4
(2009) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
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AIG sold protection to cover possible losses suffered by investors in securities
(for example, for investors in sub-prime mortgage-backed securities) in return
for payment of a regular premium.100 To demonstrate its creditworthiness for
the trade, AIG would normally be expected to provide collateral and increase
the amount of this collateral in the event that its own creditworthiness fell. 101
In this way, it has been estimated that AIG had written credit default swaps
("CDS") with a notional exposure of $441 billion-$58 billion written on
subprime mortgage backed securities. 10 2 Indeed, the full extent of AIG's
obligations in the CDS market was sufficiently complex to require repeat
revisions in the terms of the AIG bailout-the depth of the losses seemingly
confounding the regulators long after the initial September 2008 rescue was
undertaken.103 As with the cross-border buy-and-sell of the underlying
securities, the provision of the credit protection to hedge the risks involved also
extended globally, the shifting of risk between investors and protection
providers like AIG being carried out with little heed paid to the geographical
locations of the players.104 With respect to AIG, this was indicated by the U.S.
Treasury's disclosure of the identity of the larger counter-parties that received
payments from AIG following the bailout, whose various bases extended from
the United States and Canada to various European jurisdictions.10 5
It is arguable that the international regulatory framework could have been
well-suited to checking some of the concerns arising from the activities of a
player like AIG. For one, AIG was involved in the global movement and
dispersion of credit risk that not only obfuscated the locations of where risk
was becoming concentrated, but also made it difficult for any one national
regulator to get a full picture of the scale of the potential fallout arising from
the activities in which AIG and other market players had become involved
through their dealing in CDS.106 Although it may have been possible for AIG's
100 See, e.g., id. at 3.
101 TuRNER REvIEw, supra note 4, at 22 (2009).
102 AIG Rescue: Size Matters, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20,2008, at 31.
103 AIG Gets Access to $20.9 Billion in Fed's Commercial Paper Program, TRADING MARKETS, Nov. 1,
2008, http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%o20News/1987530/; Douglas W. Diamond & Anil K.
Kashyap, The F.A.Q.'s of Lehman and A.I.G., N.Y. TIMs' FREAKoNOMIcs BLOG, Sept. 18, 2009,
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/diamond-and-kashyap-on-the-recent-financial-upheavals/;
see also, Press Release, U.S. Federal Reserve (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/20081 1 Oa.htm.
104 See NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 80.
105 Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Firms to Which it Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2009, at Al; see also A.I.G. Payments to Counterparties, N.Y. Times Documents, Mar. 15, 2009, available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/aig-bailout-disclosed-counterparties#p=1.
106 See Joe Nocera, Propping up a House ofCards, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 28, 2009, at Bi.
2010] 101
HeinOnline  -- 24 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 101 2010
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
home-state regulators in the United States to attempt to gauge the extent of the
international interconnections (as the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve
tried to do following the bailout), AIG's activities in the market generated
considerable cross-border vulnerabilities for investors throughout the
geographical spectrum, where its counterparties and the counterparties of those
counterparties operated based on the credit protection that appeared to hedge
their risks in the market.107 Accordingly, an optimal understanding of the risk
movements underlying the financial markets and the individual accumulation
of risks building on the books of firms would likely only have been possible
through more careful and coordinated oversight between national regulators. os
Hindsight makes such an argument almost self-evident. However, the absence
of effective coordination mechanisms between national regulators, coupled
with the sectoral divisions underlying the work of standard-setting bodies,
meant that the international regulatory system had not evolved to match the
market in which players like AIG were operating, which traded across national
lines and sold products like CDS that did not fall neatly into traditionally
functional categories.109 The broken lines of international oversight left
regulators without a fulsome understanding of the risks burdening firms, and
the market more generally, in the event of financial failure.1 10
In addition, the operation of a robust international regulatory architecture
can become useful in cases were home-state oversight practices may not fully
capture or sanction the risky behavior of firms. By way of illustration, the
regulation of insurance business in the United States is divided between the
fifty state commissions.II Given the multiplicity of financial regulatory
agencies at work at the federal level, alongside a network of state
authorities,1 12 the supervision of a firm like AIG-at once involved in the
insurance as well as the securities business-was uneven and inadequate, with
107 Walsh, supra note 105, at Al.
108 See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 4, at9.
109 Lisa Fairfax, Turning a Blind Eye?, CONGLOMERATE, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.
org/2008/10/turning-a-blind.html.
110 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Principles of Reforming the U.S. and International
Regulatory Capital Framework for Banking Firms 1 (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/docs/capital-statement 090309.pdf
111 Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National
Association ofInsurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 629, 629 (1999) ("Insurance is unique among
financial services in that it is regulated by the states.").
112 Elizabeth Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single
Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 1, 28-39 (2005). For a detailed discussion of the U.S.
regulatory architecture and the problems raised by the operation of a fragmented framework, see also Yadav,
supra note 9.
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little regulation requiring AIG to maintain sufficient capital to buffer against
the risks that it was building up in the financial markets.113 Similarly, oversight
of CDS was not adequately policed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC"), or the various insurance commissions, given the multi-category
nature of the CDS product offering.114 Thus, it is possible that international
oversight mechanisms may assist local regulators to grapple with the risks
being created by their local charges in cases where home-state oversight
mechanisms may have failed to grasp the full impact of regulatory difficulty,
and where shared vulnerabilities create incentives for collective cross-border
regulatory processes to check the development of risks generated by deficient
home-state supervision.
B. Kaupthing
The failure of Iceland's Kaupthing Bank highlighted the potential for
systemic banking crises to transmit across jurisdictions through the operation
of cross-border subsidiaries and branches of a failing bank. It underscores the
importance of equipping the international regulatory system with mechanisms
to prevent systemic crises better, as well as coordinated tools to equip
regulators to deal with the onset of contagion.115
As highlighted above, the operation of complex corporate webs of
subsidiaries and branches can obscure the movement of risk within an
organization and give regulators assurance that legal separation between group
entities (for example, through subsidiaries) can safeguard against the spread of
risks between them.116 Kaupthing provided banking services in thirteen
jurisdictions, spanning regions from Europe to the Middle East, and operated
through a mix of both subsidiaries and branches.117 In 2007, Kaupthing Bank,
including its internet arm Kaupthing Edge, controlled assets of C58.3 billion
and derived approximately 70% of its profits from business undertaken outside
Iceland.!18
113 See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943, 986-88 (2009).
114 Fairfax, supra note 109.
115 See NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 80-88.
116 See generally supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
1 See generally KAUPTHING, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.kaupthing.comlibrary/
13859.
118 BASEL COMM., supra note 1, at 12-13 (2009).
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When catastrophic losses affecting Iceland's Glitnir Bank and its
Landesbanki caused both these banks to enter resolution proceedings, concern
regarding the possible non-viability of Kaupthing Bank caused a severe fall in
depositor confidence, leading its depositors in the United Kingdom,
Luxembourg, Germany, Finland, and the Isle of Man to start withdrawing their
holdings in Kaupthing. 119 Despite initial assurances that it would survive,
Icelandic banking authorities took over Kaupthing and provided limited
assurance that Iceland would guarantee only domestic deposits. 120 As a result
of Kaupthing's operations, which had expanded to beyond what its capital and
liquidity reserves could support and had exceeded the capacity of what home
regulators could cover by deposit guarantees, host-state authorities were
required to underwrite customer deposits in their respective jurisdictions to
prevent the further spiral of crisis through already shaken domestic banking
sectors. 121
The Kaupthing crisis is instructive. First, the failure raises the seriousness
of the threat posed by systemic crises by highlighting the reality of cross-
border contagion, with the potential for crises to spread from the operation of
an international bank's subsidiaries and branches. In such cases, domestic
mechanisms for controlling systemic crises (for example, deposit guarantees or
lender-of-last-resort facilities) may not always be sufficient. In particular, host-
country regulators may be underprepared or insufficiently resourced to manage
cross-border banking spillover. This may be likely where there are shortfalls in
information sharing between banking regulators or between the banks and their
host regulators, such that a host-country regulator may not have meaningful
information regarding operations of a foreign bank on its soil (especially where
these concern branch rather than local subsidiary operations). 12 2 Furthermore,
where local regulators may themselves be contending with failing national
banks (for example, as the United Kingdom had to handle the failure of
119 lain Martin, Kaupthing Edge Payouts Start This Morning, Says ING, CITY WIRE, Oct. 10, 2008, http://
www.citywire.co.uk/personall-/news/money-property-and-tax/content.aspx?ID=317137; Rowena Mason,
Iceland Suspends Share Trades as Kaupthing Is Nationalised, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 9, 2008,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/3165354/Iceland-suspends-share-trades-as-Kaupthing-is-
nationalised.html ("[Kaupthing chairman Sigurdur Einarsson] also blamed the mass withdrawal of funds from
Kaupthing Edge for the demise of the bank in Britain.").
120 Mason, supra note 119.
121 BASEL COMM., supra note 1, at 12-13; see also Tasneem Brogger, Iceland Takes Over Kaupthing as
Biggest Banks Fail, BLOOMBERGCOM, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
206011 10&sid=a6s61daCJ2Ko.
122 See Javier Espinoza, Kaupthing Goes Kaput, FORBES, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/
09/kaupthing-iceland-nationalization-markets-equity-cx je 1009markets04.html.
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Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, or Halifax banks) domestic coffers may
not always be sufficiently deep to support guarantees such as those provided in
respect of Kaupthing.123
Secondly, the crisis brings to the fore some of the tensions underlying the
division of supervisory responsibilities between home- and host-state
regulators. With the expansion of cross-border banking, supervisors are
increasingly required to assume a degree of risk on the quality of oversight
undertaken by counterparts in other jurisdictions.124 In particular,
commentators have noted that cross-border expansion can often be motivated
by banks seeking to capitalize on weaker supervisory regimes to lower the
regulatory costs to which they are subject and to derive higher profits from
risky behavior.125 In addition, underpriced safety nets that generously cover
deposit protection, but without necessarily requiring meaningful contributions
from banks themselves, can potentially give rise to moral hazard and excessive
risk taking.126 As demonstrated in the case of Kaupthing, regulators in various
host states were required to assume the risk of supervisory failure at the level
of the bank's home state and make amends to their own domestic depositors,
when home-state regulator resources fell short. 127 In light of this burden
sharing, it is arguable that the incentives towards cooperation between
regulators and information sharing may not necessarily be aligned, even in the
case of regulatory colleges, which are designed to stem the spread of systemic
risks through mutual assistance strategies.128 In particular, as shown in the
Kaupthing case, domestic regulators take on considerable risk that the collapse
of a foreign subsidiary or branch could set off systemic crisis within the host's
market, requiring assistance to be provided through deposit protection or
lender-of-last-resort facilities. 12 9 Nevertheless, if they are aware that host states
would likely step in to safeguard against systemic spills, home-state
supervisors may not necessarily be particularly invested in ensuring the safety
123 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2009: COMMODITIES AT THE CROSSROADS 20-21
(2009).
124 Mattias Persson, Crisis Resolution in a Global Context: Regulation and Supervision for Cross-Border
Banking, in GLOBALIZATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK 379, 382 (Douglas D. Evanoff, David S. Hoelscher &
George G. Kaufman eds., 2009).
125 See, e.g., Claudia M. Buch & Gayle DeLong, Cross-Border Bank Mergers: Regulatory Arbitrage or
Good Business? 2-3 (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.eu-financial-system.org/fileadmin/content/
Dokumente Events/first conference/Buch deLong.pdf
126 Id
127 See Brogger, supra note 121.
128 Persson, supra note 124, at 385-86.
129 See Brogger, supra note 121.
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and soundness of their traveling banks. In addition, where home-state
supervisors give foreign depositors access to their own deposit-protection
schemes, they may be very unwilling to assist host regulators to take measures
(for example, preemptively closing an overly risky bank branch) that may
trigger deposit protection in their own home state. Accordingly, it would
appear as if crisis management at the international level may require more than
the simple establishment of regulatory colleges or information sharing talk-
shops, given the asymmetry of incentives that may be at play between
regulators at times of market stress.
Thirdly, the Kaupthing case indicates that it may be difficult to predict
which institutions may be likely to trigger cross-border, systemic contagion.
Notwithstanding its quite substantial operations, it is unlikely that Kaupthing
Bank, or indeed Northern Rock, would have been regarded as systemically
special so as to warrant the careful oversight promised to firms regarded as too
big to fail.130 And yet their failure entailed significant costs and raised grim
prognoses of possible systemic crisis.131 As such, it may not be sufficient to
provide consolidated supervision over only the larger firms in order to better
control the incidence of systemic risk. Indeed, colleges of supervisors, while
certainly useful as a means of improving co-operation, may possibly divert
regulatory resources and attention from oversight of smaller players, which
despite their relatively lower visibility may nevertheless inflict considerable
damage on the international regulatory system in case of failure.
C. Lehman Brothers
In the immediate aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings
International ("LBHI"), global capital markets suffered a serious constriction
of liquidity, with credit risk spreads rising to record levels.132 Formerly "safe"
repositories for investments, such as money market funds, suffered panicked
runs as investors sought a flight to safety, setting off widespread market
distress.133 Furthermore, the international organizational complexity of
Lehman's operations contributed significantly to market uncertainty. Lehman's
clients (e.g. of its prime brokerage business), accustomed to a seamless
130 See Jenkins & Davies, supra note 92; see also Yadav, supra note 9.
131 Jenkins & Davies, supra note 92.
132 Richard J. Herring, Why and How Resolution Policy Must Be Improved, in THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE
FED 171, 172 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009).
133 Id. at 173-74; INV. Co. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROuP 53-57 (2009),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr 09 nnwg.pdf
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operation delivered through its weave of global operations,134 suddenly found
their assets frozen indefinitely in bankruptcy proceedings under the laws of
various jurisdictions, with which they were not necessarily familiar.135 Indeed,
insolvency proceedings in respect of failed trades continue to preoccupy
national authorities worldwide.136 Before the Lehman Brothers' insolvency,
thousands of trades had been put through to be settled by Lehman's broker-
dealer arm and its affiliates worldwide.137 Following bankruptcy, these trades
have failed to settle, leading to proceedings across Asia, Europe, and North
America. For example, the U.K. administrator reported that approximately
43,000 trades in Lehman's U.K. subsidiaries required separate negotiation with
the individual counterparties involved. 138
Managing the failure of Lehman Brothers has not proceeded smoothly. 139
First, it has underscored the paucity of mechanisms within domestic legal
systems to deal with the insolvency of a non-bank financial institution.
Although the United States has long operated a relatively efficient wind-down
process for banks under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICA") 140-which triggers early regulatory
intervention when a struggling institution remains solvent-a similar device
has not been readied for other types of institutions, such as investment banks
like Lehman, insurers like AIG, and other systemically relevant institutions
like hedge funds and pension funds.141 This leaves regulators exposed to
market uncertainties fomented by the vagaries of corporate insolvency systems
that may not be well suited to dealing with the high transactional complexity,
dispersed risk allocations, and non-alignments between economic interest and
134 Following the bankruptcy of LBHI, insolvency proceedings for Lehman's various subsidiaries have
also commenced in a number of jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, Switzerland, Japan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Germany, Luxembourg, Australia, the Netherlands, and Bermuda. See BASEL COMM., supra note
1, at 12-13.
135 Saijel Kishan, R3 Capital Fund Said to Lose 31% by End of October, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 16,
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601014&sid=aHzKpl7aHVLU.
136 See Kate Lamburn, The Anti-Deprivation Principle and the Atlantic Divide, MCDERMOTT WILL &
EMERY NEwsLETTER, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetaillobject
id/59be9c3b-74a4-48bf-b4fd-7eb8b88128e4.cfi.
137 Herring, supra note 132, at 174.
138 Id
139 See Lamburn, supra note 136; Jennifer Hughes, Lehman Creditors to Face Years of Waiting, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8eal4ae8-b279-1ldd-bbc9-0000779fdl8c.html.
140 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236
(1991).
141 See id.
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creditor rights,142 as evidenced in the case of an insolvency affecting a non-
bank financial institution.1
43
Secondly, the Lehman collapse has highlighted the risks underlying the
operation of complex weaves of branch and subsidiary operations that each
require guidance through the bankruptcy process. The assets of subsidiaries
may not necessarily be located in their respective home jurisdictions, as seen in
the case of Lehman, but may be dispersed around the world between group
entities, adding to the time and complications entailed in any bankruptcy
process.144 Commentators argue that the plethora of subsidiary operations may
be due to regulatory or tax regimes favoring their operation.145 It has been
reported that the top sixteen large and complex financial institutions have
almost 2.5 times as many majority owned subsidiaries as the sixteen largest
non-financial firms. 146 Without concerted action to simplify such structures
through reform of regulatory or tax regimes, international legal loopholes are
likely to remain in some jurisdictions and not in others, prompting regulatory
arbitrage and concentrations of complexity and risks in certain jurisdictions.
Furthermore, as evidenced by the failure of Iceland's Kaupthing Bank crisis,
some jurisdictions may not always be well-prepared to deal with a systemic
crisis when risks materialize.147
Thirdly, both the Lehman failure and the market panic that ensued-as
international financial markets seemed ill-prepared for the Lehman demise-
point towards the advantages of early intervention by regulatory authorities to
secure the resolution of a failing institution.148 On an international level, this
requires some coordination and convergence on thresholds (e.g. capital
adequacy or liquidity thresholds) for corrective actions to be taken. In addition,
early intervention demands effective communication processes to operate
between supervisors and their charges to ensure that neither party is taken by
surprise in the event that a firm falls into possibly terminal distress.149 A fine
142 This may come into play where creditors hedge economic risks (e.g. using derivative products) while
retaining legal rights against debtors in bankruptcy, distorting the play of incentives between parties.
143 See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EuR. FIN. MGM. 663 (2008).
144 Herring, supra note 132, at 179.
145 Lynnley Browning, U.S. Subsidiaries in Offshore Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMfEs, Jan. 17, 2009, at B2.
146 Herring, supra note 132, at 185.
147 See discussion supra Part H1.
148 U.K. FiN. SERVS. AUTH., A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRisis 59 box 2E
(2009) [hereinafter REGULATORY RESPONSE].
149 Id. at 14.
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line must be drawn here: If intervention comes too early, or if one international
regulator jumps the gun, it may accelerate a crisis at the firm, prompting
sudden loss of confidence, investor runs, and creditors imposing more stringent
conditions in the grant or extension of credit. 150 However, as highlighted
throughout the crisis (for example, with respect to each of the case studies
discussed in this paper), late action can contribute to an intensification and
systemization of crises. 151
IV. RE-CONSTRUCTION AND REFORM
The global financial crisis and the headline events that have come to define
it have brought into relief some of the missing pieces of the international
regulatory architecture. As set out in Part II of this paper, a number of bodies
have been established within the global regulatory framework to set standards,
notably in banking, securities, and insurance, with coordination and oversight
provided under the auspices of the G-20/FSB (formerly FSF) as well as the
IMF and World Bank.152
The steady expansion of cross-border activity in the financial markets
means that the risks that are being generated through such activity may be
beyond any one national regulator to control, underscoring the urgency and
importance of reform.153 This section sets out a tentative design for the future
reconstruction of the international regulatory framework. This paper's
proposals do not seek to completely re-draw current regulatory lines; rather,
they attempt to rearrange its parts in light of the lessons that have been learned
in the course of the financial crisis. The proposals are centered to deal with the
following issues: (i) oversight of systemic risks, (ii) standard-setting, and (iii)
prescription vs. principles in international regulation. The design is broadly
outlined below.
A. Systemic Risks
The fear of systemic crises has been at the center of many of the reforms
that have been undertaken in the aftermath of the financial crisis.154 As
highlighted briefly above, in response the G-20 has charged the FSB with a
150 Id. at 104 box 5.2, 109-10.
151 SeesupraPart f.
152 See supra Part ll.
153 See REGULATORY RESPONSE, supra note 148, at 5-10.
154 Id. at 5-6.
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number of tasks designed to allow for the better management of systemic risk
at the international level: (i) the formation of colleges of supervisors for the
thirty main large and complex financial institutions; (ii) collaboration with the
IMF on the performance of Early Warning Exercises and oversight of financial
stability; (iii) better coordination and information-sharing between regulators;
and (iv) monitoring of vulnerabilities within the financial system.155
Accordingly, although it is early in its establishment, the FSB appears to have
received a wide mandate for at least monitoring, if not controlling, systemic
risk at the international level. 15 6
Nevertheless, issues remain. First, the crisis has shown numerous sources
of systemic risk: (i) the interconnectedness of the financial markets through the
operation of cross-border financial services firms as well as products;157 (ii)
asymmetries of information between regulators as well as between regulators
and their charges operating abroad;158 (iii) absence of an overarching monitor
of market risk to assist domestic regulators in understanding global dispersal of
risk patterns;15 9 (iv) potential lack of alignment of incentives between home-
and host-state regulators;160 (v) absence of tools on an international scale to
practically assist in the management of systemic risk;161 and (vi) deficient or
absent resolution mechanisms for non-bank financial firms. 162
It is not yet clear how the FSB mandate will be implemented to address
these factors or how the FSB will be organized going forward to ensure careful
and focused oversight of these risks. In particular, the mission of the FSB is
sufficiently broadly worded to permit its activities to be muscularly tailored
towards the oversight of systemic risk, working alongside and bringing
together the IMF and standard-setting bodies, as detailed below.163 That being
said, it is similarly possible that in view of its relatively widely worded
mission, and the disappearing urgency of the crisis, old habits might return,
leaving the FSB as little more than a talking shop for regulators. Accordingly,
155 See supra Part II.E.
156 Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, supra note 91, at 2.
157 Shymala Gopinath, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Inaugural Address at the Fixed Income
Money Markets and Derivatives Ass'n., 1-2 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/review/rl00113d.
pdf
158 Id. at 3.
159 Id. at 1-2.
160 Id. at 3.
161 Amer & Norton, supra note 53, at 123.
162 Id. at 117.
163 See Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, supra note 91, at 2.
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it is suggested that the FSB work alongside the IMF to capitalize on the
mandate currently provided to it under the G-20, and its own expanded
membership, to independently develop channeled expertise to oversee systemic
risks.164 To achieve greater credibility, the FSB needs to include a well-
developed internal constitutional structure that includes a clear decision-
making process, supported by a dedicated panel of experts charged with
bringing together intelligence gathered by the standard-setting and other expert
bodies, such as the World Bank and the IMF.165 The FSB would be empowered
to receive alerts from domestic regulators to analyze emerging systemic risks
on the basis of Early Warning Assessments.166
While it is unlikely that the FSB will have direct enforcement powers to act
against national regulators whose local regulatory systems or supervisory
habits may be imperiling their own economies and others, having oversight
and greater consolidation in monitoring how risks in one jurisdiction overspill
into others may work to better prepare domestic and international regulators to
curb the effects of crises within their own jurisdictions. It may also allow for a
more coordinated approach to managing country risks at the local level, though
it is likely that national interests and incentives will continue to impact the
direction of decision making.
It is certainly arguable that the more muscular role suggested for the FSB
could also be played by the IMF, which has developed considerable expertise
and experience in the area of assessing macro-economic financial stability and
comprises a broader country membership.167 However, this Article suggests, as
developed further below, that the FSB may be helpful by institutionalizing
greater consolidation within the international regulatory architecture; providing
a coordination, data-sharing, and liaison mechanism for standard-setting bodies
(including the IMF); and, more broadly, supervising the uptake and
implementation of these standards and the spread of systemic risks.
Secondly, there appears to be considerable focus on the supervision of
systemically significant institutions, with thirty firms initially selected as
needing extra oversight in this regard.168 The FSB has been charged with the
164 Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Holds Inaugural Meeting in Basel (June 27,
2009), available at http://www.fmancialstabilityboard.org/press/pr 090627.pdf
165 id
166 See Declaration, supra note 88, at 5.
167 Id. (highlighting the IMF's universal membership and core macro-financial expertise).
168 Jenkins & Davies, supra note 92.
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coordination of colleges of supervisors for each of these institutions.169 It is
envisaged that these colleges will ensure greater coordination and disclosure
between regulators to garner a fuller picture of a firm's cross-border activities,
the products that it supplies to the market, and the degree of interconnectedness
between players.170 This work is to include the development of living wills that
outline how firms could be wound up in the event of a crisis in an effort to
better avoid the legal entanglements of the Lehman insolvency.171
However, while useful, this work may in fact provide a false sense of
security to regulators. In particular, systemically important firms are not the
only serious source of systemic risk. In many cases, smaller outfits may have
considerable (and potentially systemic) impacts, as seen in the cases of
Kaupthing,172 Northern Rock,173 or indeed the ten next important institutions
after the thirty chosen firms.174 Failure to fully understand the implications of
the activities of these smaller players may lead regulators to miss the wood for
the bigger trees in the forest. It is suggested that the FSB work, as a minimum,
to establish databases for host and home regulators to input data on firms
undertaking cross-border business within their jurisdictions, for access by other
regulators only.175 In this regard, the FSB, working with national authorities,
could develop a core set of information requirements for input into such
databases.176 Based on such information, national regulators may convene to
undertake coordinated risk-based oversight of multinational firms. While
colleges are certainly useful and ought to be deployed where possible, the FSB
can simultaneously work to bring a supervisory umbrella over a wider cross-
section of the international financial market, which although far from perfect,
will nevertheless provide regulators with some trajectory of a firm's activities
within and without their borders. Based on recent events, it does not appear
wise to leave vast sectors of the cross-border market without some form of
consolidated oversight, simply because the key actors involved are not
169 id.
170 id.
171 See id.
172 HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: THE IMPACT OF THE FAILURE OF THE
ICELANDIC BANKS, 2008-9, H.C. 402, at 20-24.
173 See generally HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, 1 THE RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, H.C.
56-I.
174 See generally Jenkins & Davies, supra note 92.
175 FIN. STABILITY BD., TuE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS 6 (Oct. 29, 2009).
176 Id. at 25.
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considered to be sufficiently important to warrant special regulatory
attention.
In addition, while living wills provide useful disclosure, they are unlikely
to be particularly helpful, given the almost constant fluxes in a firm's trading
activities, such that they may provide a fairly temporary and general picture
only.178 In this regard, there may be uncertainty as to the extent to which such
living wills will cover the full corporate group, including subsidiary or affiliate
operations, especially when these are based outside of the home state.179 To
suggest that the very existence of a living will may trump the various
insolvency laws in the jurisdictions where the firm operates, or provide
anything other than an informational guide in its application, would appear to
be optimistic indeed. Accordingly, unless the wills are developed and updated
on a very regular basis, and simultaneously checked for compliance with local
laws in which a firm does business, it may only be of limited or evidentiary
value.180 In view of the above, it would appear to be all the more urgent to
develop principles for the insolvency of non-bank financial institutions to
supplement the work of the World Bank and the IMF in the area of bank
insolvency.181 Such principles or guidelines can serve as a guide for local
regulators to develop a legal framework for regulating the insolvency of non-
bank financial institutions that is compatible with internationally accepted
standards as well as with the tenor of local insolvency laws and culture.
Thirdly, domestic legal systems deal with systemic risks using a number of
tools-for example, lender-of-last-resort facilities to provide last-minute
liquidity to struggling sectors of the economy and/or deposit insurance to
dampen the spread of investor panic. 182 As highlighted above, the use of these
mechanisms entails taxpayer costs and therefore carries the potential for
regulators to ration resort to these tools-for example, making these available
177 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
178 Contra David K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Institute of International Bankers Conference on Cross-border Insolvency Issues: Supervising and Resolving
Large Financial Institutions (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20091 11 Oa.htm.
179 "Living will" requirements for institutions are contemplated as domestic legal requirements, intended
for use when a financial institution collapses. See, e.g., COuNcm ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IMPROVING
RESOLUTION OPTIONS FOR SYSTEMICALLY RELEVANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2009).
180 Id. at 4.
181 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & THE WORLD BANK, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL,
INSTITUTIONAL, AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BANK INSOLVENCY (2009).
182 CHARLES GOODHART & GERHARD ILLING, FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST
RESORT 1 (2002).
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to home-grown banks only, rather than subsidiaries of foreign banks, or
branches of foreign firms, even though customers do not necessarily
distinguish between domestic or international entities.183
Accordingly, it is suggested that the international community support the
supervision and regulation of cross-border systemic risk through the
establishment of a dedicated fund to assist domestic regulators to top-off local
depository insurance reserves and/or provide emergency liquidity to domestic
central banks and national authorities where local funds for emergency aid may
be depleted. Resort to such a fund would require domestic regulators to
demonstrate need for addressing the eruption of sudden systemic risks. While
it may be argued that this regulation may lead to moral hazard for local
regulators, 184 who may then be less exacting in deciding when to hand out
assistance to endangered banks, the international regulatory system must
nevertheless be buttressed with suitable tools for addressing specific, globally
relevant risks.185 Given its role as a financial stability overseer for the
international community, the IMF, with input from the FSB, can helpfully
administer such a fund.
B. Standard Setting
As set out in Part II of this paper, the international regulatory architecture
comprises a number of standard-setting bodies that develop best practice
guidelines, principles, and standards for the regulation of the international
financial markets.186 Key bodies include the BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS, each
contributing to the development of the body of standards currently
underpinning the framework for international oversight.187
Nevertheless, this paper has argued that the market has moved far from the
traditional sectoral classifications that once defined firms as well as the
products they traded.18 8 This has been most clearly evidenced by the abolishing
of Glass-Steagall type restrictions that have permitted firms to provide banking
services-investment banking services as well as insurance-to customers
183 See supra Part R.B.
184 See supra Part I.E.
185 See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
186 See discussion supra Part II.
187 See discussion supra Part II.
188 See discussion supra Part I.
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from within the same institution. 189 As detailed, firms now offer products that
cannot easily be classified into one sectoral category, such as certificates of
deposit or certain types of annuities. As a result of their category crossover,
these products can slip between the cracks of sectorally based oversight. To
further complicate the picture in the secondary markets, the definition of what
is regarded by firms as banking and investment banking is also changing. The
striking example of this, as witnessed through the crisis, may be seen in the
high-traffic repo market that provides liquidity and cash/securities "deposit"
facilities to players.190 The repo market has been analyzed by some
commentators as being functionally similar to a market for banking services
for the secondary markets, such that the risks raised by its operation may also
be analogous. 191
Therefore, to match the evolution and structure of the market, there is little
reason to continue with strict sectoral divisions between standard-setting
bodies. It is therefore suggested that the BCBS, the IAIS, and IOSCO be
expanded to include the establishment of an additional body (e.g. panel) that
formally and functionally brings these standard setters closer together.192 The
work undertaken by each of these bodies would be reviewed and approved by
this panel. Such an additional consolidating layer standing above these three
sectoral-standard setters can help to create an increasingly fluid boundary
between their work and permit these bodies to develop a more sector-blind
agenda that is better suited to market complexities. It is suggested that this
panel be housed in and report to the FSB to ensure that the FSB has an even
picture of the regulatory work being undertaken. This will support a move
towards more broad-based and consolidated supervision and regulation by the
FSB.
C. Prescription Versus Principles
This Article argues that reform of the international regulatory architecture
is required to better support the operation of regulatory rationales that have
underpinned the development of regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the
189 J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Consequences ofRepealing the Glass-Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
129, 129-30 (1995).
190 GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 15-17 (2010).
191 Id. at 15.
192 This should be done more formally and robustly than is currently organized under the fairly loose Joint
Forum.
2010] 115
HeinOnline  -- 24 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 115 2010
EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
domestic context.193 In addition, the institutional shape likely to be assumed by
the rationales will necessarily differ given the particularities of international
regulation and the constraints to which it is subject. Although this Article
proposes that there be greater consolidation within the various international
regulatory bodies to provide better breadth of oversight and more stringent
"full-picture" supervisory coverage of systemic risks, the "regulations"
themselves should be less prescriptive and more principles-based to provide
for better absorption into the variety of country frameworks likely to be
affected. The debate surrounding the effectiveness of legal transplants of
model laws into national legal frameworks is necessarily complex, such that a
full discussion here is not possible.194 However, this Article suggests that
highly prescriptive regulatory model laws for transposition across national
regulatory frameworks are unlikely to be successful. Given the particularities
of national legal systems, as well as of regulatory cultures that may differ in
emphases between predominating rationales for regulation (for example, where
one may choose to offer relatively stronger consumer protection mechanisms
than others), a focus on developing a principles-based jurisprudence in this
area may be fruitful.195 National regulatory mechanisms may be attuned to
local needs and habits, such that highly codified mechanisms may not
incentivize regulators and firms to fully accept them where these do not gel
well into local law and practice.196 As an example, despite the detailed
extrapolation of capital adequacy rules by the BCBS as a statement of
international best practice and consensus on the issue, the United States
retained its use of the leverage ratio as a key tool in determining appropriate
levels of bank capital. This has been seen as having worked well during the
crisis197 and perhaps reflects the regulatory comfort with this arguably less
refined, calibrated device.
Looking forward, to mitigate some of the risks set out above, it has been
suggested by the BCBS that there be greater convergence in national regimes
with respect to the tools available for the resolution of large and complex
193 See discussion supra Part IV.
194 For a more in-depth treatment see Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families
and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REv. 1813 (2009).
195 See Christopher Cox, Former SEC Chairman, Speech at the FEI 2008 Current Financial Reporting
Issues Conference: The Future of International Standards and Cooperation in Light of the Credit Crisis (Nov.
18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch111808cc.htm.
196 See id.
197 See id.
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financial institutions. 198  However, while such convergence may be
theoretically desirable, particularities of national legal systems are likely to
stand in the way of consensus. Staying on the point of insolvency, these laws
are technical, complex, and often reflect national particularities and cultures, 199
therefore, binding countries that do not all share legal traditions, history, and
cultures and seeking to create a harmonizing jurisprudence may be
misconceived. Rather, as suggested above, it may be easier for regulators to
absorb a principles-based approach that seeks to ensure that national legal
systems comply with a set of internationally approved principles, reflecting
best practice that nevertheless gives space to lawmakers to see to it that new
laws are in tune with national legal systems, traditions, and culture.
CONCLUSION: CRISIS AND RE-CONSTRUCTION
The global financial crisis is forcing a thorough re-evaluation of the
international regulatory architecture. The crisis has shown not only the cracks
in regulatory oversight, but also a market operation that had long outgrown and
outwitted its overseers.200 This Article has argued that the international
financial market may be seen as having its own distinct personality, the recent
expansion bringing with it a unique set of regulatory risks. Accordingly, just as
with domestic regulatory systems, the regulation of the international financial
marketplace ought to be rooted in the legal and economic rationales that have
been advanced in support of financial markets regulation generally, in order
that reform proceed thoughtfully, rather than on an ad hoc and knee-jerk
basis. 20 1 This Article contemplates a re-organization of the current plethora of
standard-setting and oversight bodies that have provided little substantial
protection in the face of the crisis. In sum, it puts forward a case for a more
consolidated framework for standard setting and supervision that better
matches the shape that the market has assumed, and that further works to
ensure a greater focus on catching and managing the dangers of cross-border
systemic risk.
198 Tools that should be available include rules to deal with such complex and nationally diverging tools
as special resolution regimes for financial institutions, netting and collateral rights, or power to terminate
contracts. See BASEL COMM., supra note 1, at 25-26.
199 Different legal systems may accord varying emphases to creditor-debtor rights, or they may not in all
cases provide for the operation of automatic set-off and netting; state aid rules may differ in allowing bailouts
to be undertaken.
200 See discussion supra Part I11.
201 See discussion supra Part IV.
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Nevertheless, the international regulatory framework is a slippery one. It is
constrained by state sovereignty, the pernicious play of national interests, and
the multiplicity of legal cultures and traditions that make regulation subject to
potentially inconsistent interpretation and application.202 Still, as this crisis
shows, notwithstanding the frustrations of international regulation, the risks it
203
seeks to control have become increasingly common. So, even if we are
bound to fall short by the fickle forces that face us, the path of the stone, and
its weight on our shoulders, are as inescapable as the deeds for which they are
designed to atone.
202 See discussion supra Part M.
203 See id.
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